Reputation and Precedent in the Bevacizumab Decision by Kesselheim, Aaron Seth & Joffe, Steven
 
Reputation and Precedent in the Bevacizumab Decision
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Carpenter, Daniel, Aaron S. Kesselheim, and Steven Joffe.
2011. “Reputation and Precedent in the Bevacizumab
Decision.” New England Journal of Medicine 365, no. 2: e3.
Published Version doi:10.1056/NEJMp1107201
Accessed February 16, 2015 5:19:29 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13064547
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's
DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and
conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAPerspective     
The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE
10.1056/nejmp1107201  nejm.org e6(1)
metastatic  breast  cancer.  Ap-
proval was based on the results 
of  E2100,  a  cooperative-group 
randomized trial that showed a 
5.5-month  increase  in  progres-
sion-free  survival  associated 
with  the  addition  of  bevacizu-
mab  to  paclitaxel  therapy.1,2 
Confirmatory studies by Genen-
tech,  the  manufacturer,  howev-
er,  showed  that  bevacizumab’s 
benefits  for  progression-free 
survival  may  be  appreciably 
smaller  than  those  shown  in 
E2100  and  have  demonstrated 
convincingly  that  the  addition   
of  bevacizumab  to  the  chemo-
therapy agents they have tested 
offers  no  increase  in  overall   
survival  among  patients  with 
metastatic  breast  cancer.  As  a 
result, the FDA proposed remov-
ing the metastatic breast cancer 
indication  from  bevacizumab’s 
label. Genentech filed an oppos-
ing  petition  to  request  an  ad-
ministrative  hearing  on  the  is-
sue (available on the company’s 
Web site, www.gene.com), which 
is scheduled to begin June 28.
Genentech  has  a  legal  right 
to appeal and request a hearing 
on scientific grounds, including 
the possibility that bevacizumab’s 
efficacy  depends  on  the  choice 
of chemotherapy partner or that 
progression-free survival is a di-
rect rather than surrogate mea-
sure of clinical benefit in meta-
static  breast  cancer.  Given 
expert disagreement about how 
to  interpret  bevacizumab’s  per-
formance  in  the  confirmatory 
trials,  a  hearing  is  appropriate 
to clarify the risks and benefits 
of  the  drug.  In  addition  to  its 
scientific  claims,  however,  Ge-
nentech  advanced  four  philo-
sophical  and  political  argu-
ments  to  oppose  the  FDA’s 
proposed withdrawal of the in-
dication: first, the move has no 
precedent; second, the possibili-
ty of benefit in subgroups of pa-
tients  justifies  continued  ap-
proval; third, individual patients’ 
choice ought to be paramount; 
and fourth, the FDA’s move will 
obfuscate the drug-development 
picture  and  discourage  innova-
tion.  In  addition,  Genentech, 
claiming  that  the  members  of 
the  Oncologic  Drugs  Advisory 
Reputation and Precedent in the Bevacizumab Decision
Daniel Carpenter, Ph.D., Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., J.D., and Steven Joffe, M.D., M.P.H.
I
n February 2008, the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) granted accelerated approval 
to bevacizumab (Avastin) in combination with pac-
litaxel as first-line treatment for HER-2 negative 
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Committee  (ODAC)  are  biased 
and  have  inadequate  expertise, 
specifically  requested  that  its 
hearing  be  conducted  before  a 
different committee.
The  precedent  for  removing 
bevacizumab’s indication is im-
plicit in the U.S. drug regulatory 
process. Requirements for thor-
ough experimentation undergird 
that  process  and  modern  drug 
marketing. Phased clinical trials 
ensure that drugs’ safety and ef-
ficacy are established with a va-
riety  of  data  from  research  in 
humans. These trials also create 
a  public  good  of  vast  propor-
tions,  since  the  data  are  used 
downstream in prescribing, for-
mulary,  and  drug-development 
decisions  by  actors  other  than 
the FDA and the company. This 
system  of  experimentation,  re-
fined over the past 60 years, de-
pends  on  the  FDA’s  regulatory 
authority.3  The  key  trigger  in-
ducing  sponsors  to  conduct 
these studies reliably and rigor-
ously  is  the  FDA’s  veto  power 
over market entry for new drugs 
or for new indications for previ-
ously approved drugs.
Begun in 1992 under Subpart 
H of the New Drug Regulations, 
accelerated approval has origins 
in  the  scientific  and  political 
battles over treatments for HIV–
AIDS.  The  process  permits  the 
FDA to grant marketing authori-
zation on the basis of so-called 
surrogate  end  points,  such  as 
progression-free  survival,  that 
are  judged  reasonably  likely  to 
predict clinical improvements in 
morbidity or mortality. The ac-
celerated  approval  mechanism 
thus creates a contract between 
the  FDA  and  a  pharmaceutical 
company: in return for promises 
of  further  clinical  studies,  the 
company  receives  provisional 
approval  and  rapid  market  ac-
cess.  Accelerated  approval  re-
quires the sponsor to “study the 
drug  further,  to  verify  and  de-
scribe its clinical benefit,” doing 
so “with due diligence.”
Ultimately, data from confir-
matory  studies  should  either 
permit conversion to regular ap-
proval or lead to withdrawal of 
the  indication  in  question. 
Hence,  accelerated  approval  is 
provisional  —  a  medium-term 
stopover en route to full approv-
al or market withdrawal. There 
should be a clear end point and, 
after  a  reasonable  period  for 
confirmatory trials, the sponsor 
should  provide  evidence  that 
meets  the  standard  for  regular 
approval.  If  such  evidence 
emerges, the FDA must convert 
the drug’s status to regular ap-
proval. Otherwise, the FDA must 
rescind approval. Without a gen-
uine option to withdraw acceler-
ated approval in light of either 
inadequate  or  unfavorable  con-
firmatory  data,  the  FDA  would 
have  few  tools  to  ensure  that 
companies provide the new, rig-
orous data they promised to ob-
tain.3 Although such adverse de-
cisions  may  be  contested,  the 
integrity  of  the  accelerated  ap-
proval  process  and  the  FDA’s 
reputation  and  authority  as  a 
public  health  agency  require 
that it be willing to make and 
adhere  to  these  difficult  deci-
sions.
A central question in the be-
vacizumab  dispute  concerns 
whether  the  standard  for  con-
version of accelerated to regular 
approval has been met. Genen-
tech  argues  that  progression-
free  survival  is  an  acceptable 
measure of direct clinical bene-
fit  in  metastatic  breast  cancer 
and  that  confirmatory  trials 
demonstrate  that  bevacizumab 
prolongs  progression-free  sur-
vival.  Yet  the  progression-free–
survival benefit in confirmatory 
trials, while statistically signifi-
cant,  was  considerably  smaller 
than that seen in E2100. In ad-
dition, safety concerns — both 
new and previously described — 
have arisen from the recent clin-
ical  trials.1,2  Genentech  further 
claims  that  the  FDA  has 
switched approval standards for 
bevacizumab. The agency, how-
ever,  has  consistently  main-
tained that progression-free sur-
vival  is  “not  statistically 
validated  as  surrogate  for  sur-
vival in all settings” and is “not 
precisely measured.”4 Therefore, 
the FDA has full authority to re-
spond to adverse safety and ef-
ficacy data by changing medica-
tion labeling.
Genentech’s  second  claim, 
that the possibility of heteroge-
neity  in  the  treatment  effect 
should justify continued approv-
al,  suffers  from  an  absence  of 
data  identifying  which  patient 
characteristics  are  associated 
with  clinical  benefit.  As  the 
FDA’s  decision  memorandum 
notes, the mere prospect of ef-
ficacy in subgroups of patients, 
without  the  ability  to  identify 
those  subgroups  in  advance,  is 
inadequate  as  a  rationale  for 
continued approval.
Genentech’s  philosophical 
claim that “conflicting interpre-
tations  of  data  should  be  re-
solved in favor of retaining ac-
cess  and  choice”  represents  a 
departure  from  federal  statute 
and  a  bold  challenge  to  the 
FDA’s mission. In a democratic 
republic, access and choice rep-
resent two among many values. 
The FDA must also protect sci-
entific  rigor,  the  integrity  and 
legitimacy of federal regulations 
and  guidance,  and  the  public’s 
health. The agency’s reputation 
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for using science to guide regu-
latory decisions in the public in-
terest is its most critical institu-
tional asset.3
Genentech’s  claim  that  re-
moval of indications from drug 
labels  will  chill  innovation  is 
unpersuasive. The FDA often re-
moves indications from labeling 
and commonly rejects new drug 
applications. Yet there is no con-
sistent  evidence  that  such  ac-
tions  deter  the  development  of 
clinically valuable therapies. In-
deed, the relationship might be 
the  reverse:  if  bevacizumab  of-
fers  little  promise  for  patients 
with  metastatic  breast  cancer, 
then  removing  the  indication 
may create a clinical and market 
niche  that  provides  other  com-
panies with an incentive to de-
velop  a  better  product  for,  or 
test  available  products  in,  that 
population.
The bevacizumab decision in-
volves  not  merely  the  drug  but 
the credibility of the institutions 
themselves.  Underlying  the 
back-and-forth  about  bevaciz-
umab’s  trial  performance  is  a 
larger issue: the precedent that 
will  be  established  if  the  FDA 
reverses  its  decision  on  with-
drawing bevacizumab’s labeling 
for metastatic breast cancer not 
because  of  changing  scientific 
evidence,  but  in  response  to 
philosophical and political coun-
terarguments. As with other FDA 
labeling decisions, the ultimate 
outcome in the bevaciz  umab case 
is reversible; Genentech remains 
free to define beva  cizumab’s ef-
ficacy  through  further  studies. 
If the FDA demonstrates that it 
is unable or unwilling to with-
draw accelerated approval when 
the totality of evidence fails to 
meet its standard for regular ap-
proval,  however,  such  a  prece-
dent risks undermining the basis 
for accelerated approval mecha-
nisms  and,  more  broadly,  the 
agency’s credibility as it seeks to 
regulate  medical  products  for 
the public good.
Disclosure  forms  provided  by  the  au-
thors are available with the full text of this 
article at NEJM.org.
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